Artificial islands: 'military fortresses' or 'sandcastles'? Building up rocky areas, changing reefs into islands, and building runways and infrastructure on illegally occupied islands are part of China’s "artificial islands" strategy. What impact will this change of geographical entities in the East Sea have on the area? How will this affect strategic and military calculations of the parties involved? What are the other purposes behind the military objective? Dr. Truong Minh Huy Vu, from the Faculty of International Relations of the University of Social Sciences and Humanities, Vietnam National University, talked with VietNamNet about the issues.   A vessel looks like a container ship in the area where China was building an artificial island at Chau Vien (London) Reef on October 4,2014. Photo: Asahi Shimbun China's acceleration of turning reefs in Vietnam’s Truong Sa Archipelago (Spratly Islands) into islands is now a concern of the whole region. Are they the "military fortresses" that can change the situation and the strategic calculations in the East Sea (South China Sea)? With an area of up to 3.5 million km2, a relatively enclosed waters, military experts have long discussed China's two ways to control the East Sea. One is directly through control and construction of islands/reefs into military bases and two is establishment of air-defence recognition areas limited in certain geographic scopes. To realize these two possibilities, the Chinese army needs the strategic points. In Vietnam’s Hoang Sa (Paracel Islands) and Truong Sa, the geographical subjects are mainly reefs and coral islands that do not have advantage in terms of defense or are in a severe shortage of fresh water, except for Thai Binh Island (Itu Aba) under control of Taiwan. So joining the sea from the mainland, and turning reefs into fulcrums to promote the resistance to access or intrusion (A2/AD) is always a priority of China. In Hoang Sa, which China illegally occupied from 1974, Beijing set up the so-called administrative unit of Sansha. There, China has built a 2.5 km long runway on Phu Lam (Woody) Island, which can serve tanker and fight aircraft like the Su-27/30 or bomber JH-7. China also built a wharf 400m long and a breakwater to protect boats. It is more difficult in Truong Sa because of the distance and the limitations of technology. For example, the refueling capability of the Chinese air force is still limited. This technology is important in the implementation of A2/AD, because it helps China’s fighter planes operate in the field for longer distances without having to return to the base for refueling. According to a report by the Committee for US-China Economic and Security Review (published last December), China has received the first refueling aircraft IL-78 in mid-October last year, besides 12 H-6U aircraft. The report also said that the team of tanker planes of China is still too modest and does not have the ability to conduct long-range missions on a large scale. So the fostering and building of artificial islands in Truong Sa is the best way to compensate for the limitations of geography and technology in the present time? We need a bigger picture of the link between the Navy and the Air Force as a new approach to the "standing position" of the Chinese military in the entire East Sea. Recent studies have described the trend of the Chinese People's Liberation Army (PLA) in trying to promote the so-called "coordination skill" between the various military arms, especially the air force and navy. China's main rival is the "hegemonic power" of the United States in the Pacific. The advantage of Beijing over Washington is geography, which allows China to be capable of gathering military forces faster and giving support to military units easier in the waters within the first island chain. Meanwhile, Washington will need to send reinforcements from thousands of miles away, to maintain military units over the air and sea telecommunications, and deploy activities from a small number of bases of its allies. The quadrangle of "artificial islands," formed from the reefs of Chu Thap (Cross Fiery), Vanh Khan (Mischief), Hoang Nham (Scarborough) and Woody Island (Paracels) turns the sea into land, connects the ocean from land, and helps build the "standing position" for the A2/AD strategy. It can become an "outpost" for aircraft, warships and military forces of China, through which it will prevent forces of the United States. However, there are many doubts about the possibility of "successful upgrading" of artificial islands into complete military fortresses. The goal of setting a "terrestrial military carrier" in the islands which have been extended and leveled is an example. Bad weather such as storms or the ability of salt eroding the runway are problems for the deployment of air operations. But more importantly, the structure of airports is based on the dredging of tons of sand in the seabed. It is not stable in terms of texture, and it may be the "dead" point for air strikes and missile. Two scholars from the US Naval War College said that these "airports" can only be "sand castles" and instead of finding bottlenecks to overcome the strategic losses, then this is the "new strategic vulnerability" of China in the East Sea. According to this analysis, turning artificial islands into "bases" as the springboard to control the entire East Sea is not simple. So why have many countries raised their concern when satellite images show China’s renovation of reefs, rocks or coral islands into artificial islands? Perhaps we are talking about two issues in parallel, but also contradictory. One is to assess the military ability of artificial islands as a springboard of Beijing to control the entire East Sea. These assessments emphasize the military aspect, but mention the possibility in the future, and do not mention much about the current difficulties that China is facing. They also mention the issue in a “calm” sense, meaning that the process will take place, neglecting the possibility that other countries, including neighboring countries and those outside the region, will intervene. The second view is about the limitation (military) of China in the East Sea in relation to US power. The distance of power between the two parties at the moment shows that the "strategic vulnerability" that Beijing faces is great if it launches a war with Washington (and its allies). Compared with the regional countries that have disputes with China in the East Sea, the military capability and on-the-field control of Beijing is more advantageous (and increasingly dominant). The presence and military intervention of the US will change the game. The "cost-imposition strategy”, "gray zone control", "CARAT exercise expansion" or "loosen export of unmanned aircraft" have been proposed by American strategists. But we see that in the East Sea dispute profile, the US is still "struggling" to find the optimal method to deal with a non-military China from 2009. Conversely, if the "artificial islands" are seen as a next step in Beijing's grand strategy in the East Sea, it emphasizes its continuing presence. After the so-called Sansha, fishing vessels, oil rigs, and the cow-tongue line, artificial islands continue to establish the presence of China in a lasting and more comprehensive way in the East Sea. "Presence" in the geographical sense is just equivalent to distance, and a sense of possibility to intervene. Military impact (of artificial islands) may be the future, but its psychological impact is right now, from support to marine surveillance vessels, expansion of fishing grounds, oil and gas exploration and exploitation, and ocean science research, as well as prevention of the assertion of sovereignty or jurisdiction enforcement of other countries. In addition, negotiations on the Code of Conduct in the East Sea between China and ASEAN (COC) are ongoing. The Philippines’s lawsuit against China in the East Sea dispute to the international court will also be decided in 2015. In the understanding of negotiation as the political battles progress from the "field", China’s massive construction activity in Truong Sa is a "psychological war". This psychological blow will have certain results, but whether it is an effect or consequence has still not been answered yet. Minh Cat, VNN